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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
The Cato Institute is a nonpartisan public policy research foundation founded
in 1977 and dedicated to advancing the principles of individual liberty, free markets,
and limited government. Cato’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies
was established to restore the principles of limited constitutional government that
are the foundation of liberty. Toward those ends, Cato publishes books and studies,
conducts conferences and forums, and produces the annual Cato Supreme Court
Review. This case interests Cato because it concerns the application of basic First
Amendment principles to social media, a critically important issue in the digital age.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Florida’s social media regulations purport to stop the “censorship of big tech.”
Yet the method that the state has chosen for remedying this problem is to impose its
own form of internet censorship. Florida’s law forces disfavored platforms to censor
content they otherwise would include and to host material to which they object. The
law grants special privileges to a favored class of users, discriminates among online
voices, and allows some users (but not all) to override a platform’s editorial freedom.
The law takes away a platform’s freedom to make case-by-case editorial judgments
and gives judges the power to mandate that content be removed or retained based on

1
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their own views of what is “consistent.” Further, the law establishes barriers to
competition in the market for social media platforms.
Platforms have a right to select and organize the content they host. They
likewise have a right to decline to host content. This editorial right is not contingent
on a platform’s prior exercise of the right, nor on whether a platform aims to present
a “unified” message. Although social media may be a relatively new medium, longestablished First Amendment principles should be the guide to resolving this case.
When platforms themselves speak, that speech is protected. When platforms publish
content to the public, they are protected in doing so just as the publisher of a
newspaper editorial or a book is protected. And when platforms exercise their
discretion in selecting and sorting the content they present to users, the First
Amendment protects those editorial choices.
Although Florida claims that it seeks to undermine “big tech tyranny,” its new
regulations actually benefit the largest and most established social media companies
at the expense of present and future competition. By imposing steep liability for noncompliance, these regulations would incentivize potential competitors to sell
themselves to larger entities like Facebook once they approach the law’s threshold
for regulation. Consequently, incumbents would enjoy competitive moats in contrast
to the relatively frictionless conditions that allowed them to grow.

2
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Further, the success of alternative platforms depends on their ability to
compete and on the freedom of those building new platforms to develop new
products. “Neutrality” requirements prevent the emergence of platforms with
distinct, differentiable offerings.
Whatever disagreement one may have with the editorial choices a particular
platform has made, shifting control over those choices to the state is not the answer.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLATFORMS ENGAGE IN PROTECTED EDITORIAL ACTIVITY
WHEN THEY PUBLISH, REMOVE, AND CURATE CONTENT
The First Amendment protects a platform’s freedom to select the speech it

wishes to host, a freedom that includes “deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir.
1997). Social media platforms do exactly that. Whether they select and edit with a
light or heavy hand, all social media platforms must make choices about which thirdparty content to permit and which to exclude on their platforms. These platforms
screen and monitor content based on platform-specific rules and guidelines,
withdraw previously published content, arrange content, and sometimes add their
own message to that content. To give users a less cacophonous experience amidst a
torrent of content, platforms actively rank, emphasize, and de-emphasize the speech
they host. Thus, a core aspect of social media platforms’ operation is engaging in the
editorial privilege that the First Amendment protects from government interference.

3
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First Amendment freedom
of speech encompasses the freedom to select, edit, and present speech. Writing in
the context of a newspaper editorial page, the Court explained that “[t]he choice of
material . . . the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content . . . and
treatment of public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment.” Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of
Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
But this editorial freedom extends far beyond newspapers and other print
media. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557
(1995) (finding that editorial privilege extends to parade organizers). It extends to
any platform that hosts and presents speech, including online platforms. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (noting that First
Amendment protections “do not vary when a new and different medium for
communication appears”). See also La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d
981 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (finding that the First Amendment extends to social media
networks); Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(same regarding internet search engines); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d
622, 629–30 (D. Del. 2007) (same). In sum, the First Amendment protects the
selection of speech on a public expressive platform, and that right is to be construed
broadly.
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But Florida’s social media law, S.B. 7072, significantly infringes this editorial
right for disfavored platforms. It imposes a 30-day ban on hosting certain speech
through its “consistency provision.” It also forces platforms to forgo many of their
standard moderation practices with respect to certain privileged users and imposes
draconian penalties for noncompliance. To justify its abridgement of editorial rights,
Florida argues that social media platforms are not entitled to First Amendment
protections because they do not create a “unified speech product” and because they
currently open themselves up for use by the general public with relatively light
moderation policies. But the First Amendment’s protections are not contingent on
either of these criteria.
A. A Platform’s First Amendment Rights Do Not Depend on Whether the
Platform Exercised Those Rights in the Past
Florida argues that social media platforms have held themselves out to the
public as viewpoint-neutral forums, and that for that reason it is constitutional to
force them to remain viewpoint-neutral forums indefinitely. Def.-App. Br. at 36. In
other words, Florida claims that social media platforms have forfeited their First
Amendment right to engage in ideologically based content moderation by not having
previously engaged in enough ideologically based moderation.
First Amendment rights cannot be so easily forfeited. Even if it were true that
all social media platforms currently “h[e]ld themselves out to serve the public
indiscriminately,” that would not obliterate their editorial privilege. Def.-App. Br at
5
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10 (quoting U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 740 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). And
indeed, Florida’s factual premise is false. Social media platforms routinely make
user access contingent on ongoing compliance with community standards, and this
Court has upheld their discretion to decide how to enforce those standards.
Illoominate Media, Inc. v. CAIR Fla., Inc., 841 Fed. Appx. 132 (11th Cir. 2020)
(upholding the dismissal of a lawsuit by a political personality over her Twitter ban.)
When Twitter removes content that it views as election misinformation, vaccine
misinformation, violence, and even nudity, it engages in content-based and
viewpoint-based moderation. Were it the government, those actions would be
unconstitutional—but thankfully, Jack Dorsey holds no public office.
Florida’s argument is, in essence, that social media platforms have not been
ideological enough in their editorial choices, so it is permissible to impose on them
common-carrier style speech-hosting obligations. But Florida’s “use it or lose it”
theory of speech protections is incompatible with the First Amendment regardless
of the aptness of common-carrier analogies. Then-Judge Kavanaugh identified this
logical problem in his dissent in U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, which concerned the
editorial rights of internet service providers:
The FCC’s “use it or lose it” theory of First Amendment rights finds no
support in the Constitution or precedent. . . It may be true that some,
many, or even most Internet service providers have chosen not to
exercise much editorial discretion, and instead have decided to allow
most or all Internet content to be transmitted on an equal basis. But that
“carry all comers” decision itself is an exercise of editorial discretion.
6
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Moreover, the fact that the Internet service providers have not been
aggressively exercising their editorial discretion does not mean that
they have no right to exercise their editorial discretion.
855 F.3d 381, 429 (D.C. Cir. 2017). A social media platform’s choice to include all
speech or most speech is likewise an exercise of that right. The First Amendment’s
editorial privilege applies when an actor engages in editorial activity; it doesn’t
depend on that actor’s historical exercise of that activity.
B. A Platform’s First Amendment Rights Do Not Depend on Whether the
Platform Offers a “Unified Speech Product”
Florida argues that because “social media companies cannot be said to
produce a unified speech product”—a viewpoint or message users can identify as
originating from the platform itself—they receive limited First Amendment
protection. Def.-App. Br. at 30. But the Constitution imposes no such prerequisite.
Also referred to as a “common theme” or a “coherent” speech product, this
point has received recent attention from scholars exploring whether platforms may
be regulated as common carriers consistent with the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Do Platforms Have Editorial Rights? 1 J. Free Speech L. 143
(2021); Eugene Volokh, Treating Social Media Platforms Like Common Carriers?,
1 J. Free Speech L. 377 (2021). Proponents of the coherence-as-prerequisite theory
argue that the Supreme Court has upheld infringements on the First Amendment
rights of editors when their “message” lacked unification or coherency. They argue
that the lack of a message made these infringements on editorial rights less grave.
7
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But the Supreme Court’s own explanation of the rights of editors is
incompatible with that view. “A private speaker does not forfeit constitutional
protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes
to isolate an exact message.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70. The fact that an online
platform chooses to host a wide range of views and topics is no basis for curtailing
its First Amendment rights. That choice itself embodies a protected editorial
judgment. If an editor chooses to host a wide range of voices and viewpoints, that
editor does not forfeit the right to nonetheless exclude certain speech as off-limits,
nor to prioritize some messages over others. Indeed, a contrary constitutional rule
would encourage online services to allow less speech, not more, in an attempt to
establish that they do in fact present a coherent speech product. The First
Amendment does not require that paradoxical result.
II.

THE FLORIDA LAW’S REGULATION OF PLATFORMS’ TERMS
OF SERVICE VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Platforms have both protected speech rights when they speak and protected

editorial rights when they edit. Florida’s law infringes both of these independent
rights in several ways, including an outright ban on platforms’ own speech (“the
addenda ban”) and two content- and identity-based must-carry provisions, which
force platforms to host even the most offensive content if it comes from the
government’s list of favored users. Fla. Stat. § 106.072 (1)(a); § 501.2041(2)(j).

8
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No less constitutionally infirm are the law’s restrictions on platforms’ terms
of service. Id. § 501.2041(2)(b), (c). Florida’s brief argues that these “consistency
provisions” and their “neutral” limit on changing a platform’s terms of service more
than once every 30 days are the least constitutionally suspect parts of the law. App.Def. Br. at 39 (“[I]f the Court rejects everything that has been said so far about the
Act’s hosting regulations, it should still uphold the [consistency provisions].”). But
for several reasons, these parts of the law cannot stand.
First, the law’s “consistency provision” actually functions as a ban on speech,
the type of First Amendment infringement the Constitution proscribes most strictly.
Bhagwat, supra. Under Section (2)(b), platforms are forced to remove (or keep up)
all content that is the same or similar to content they have previously taken down (or
kept up).2 This provision works in conjunction with section (2)(c), which prohibits
platforms from changing “user rules, terms, and agreements” more than once every
30 days. App.-Def. Br. at 39. Taken together, the law creates 30-day cycles of
censorship. Even if a platform wants to leave certain content up, it may not do so if
within the past 30 days it has removed other content that a court might find to be
similar to the content it wishes to leave up. This means that under the threat of

2

How platforms are supposed to determine whether certain speech is the same or similar to other
speech goes unexplained.
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draconian civil penalty, platforms could be forced to remove speech that they wish
to publish—a core First Amendment injury.
Second, Section (2)(c)’s 30-day prohibition on changing a platform’s terms of
service strikes at the core of platforms’ right to decide “whether to publish,
withdraw, postpone or alter content” by sharply limiting the exercise of these
fundamental editorial judgments. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. By cyclically seizing
control of platforms’ discretion over what to take down, what to leave up, and when
the terms of service can be changed, the law does not merely “leave the substance
of [content moderation] policies . . . entirely up to the platforms themselves” but
instead functions to periodically remove their First Amendment right to select the
content they host and display. Def.-App. Br. at 39.
Put simply, editors have a First Amendment right to make case-by-case
determinations as to what speech they wish to display and what speech they wish to
exclude. Florida’s law would, in the name of “consistency,” take that choice away
from editors and place it in the hands of the state and its judges.
III.

THOSE DISSATISFIED WITH DOMINANT PLATFORMS SHOULD
SEEK WAYS TO FACILITATE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION
Ironically, in attempting to undermine the influence of large social media

platforms, Florida’s law would likely cement their dominance. First, onerous
regulations encourage would-be competitors to sell to incumbents. Florida’s law
would create this dynamic by dramatically raising the cost of compliance, creating
10
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a Florida-specific regulatory scheme and imposing severe penalties for violations of
its must-carry and “consistency” provisions. Second, “neutrality” requirements limit
the creative space for differentiated products. The success of alternatives to large
platforms depends on competition and the freedom of those building new platforms
to develop new products. Large social media companies are by no means
invulnerable, but constraining their editorial discretion will cement the incumbency
advantages they enjoy and delay the emergence of serious competition. Big Tech’s
giants can afford a phalanx of lawyers and compliance officers; their would-be
upstart competitors may not be able to.
By complicating the regulatory environment and imposing high costs, Florida
would accomplish the opposite of its stated goals by tilting the social media
marketplace even more in favor of incumbents. Applying to platforms with annual
gross revenues in excess of $100 million or at least 100 million monthly platform
users globally, the law’s scope currently includes only Facebook, Twitter, YouTube,
TikTok, and Wikipedia (with conspicuous carveouts for theme-park owning Disney
and Comcast). By establishing such an arbitrary threshold, the law will give startups the incentive to sell themselves to one of these companies before they themselves
approach this threshold.
Competitors who would normally expect to see a steady rise in the cost of
moderating their new platforms will now face a step-change in expenses courtesy of

11
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a splintered regulatory environment that now features a Florida state-level
requirement. This new requirement would impose an unnecessary cost on existing
large platforms, but it would have a much more significant impact on businesses
considering founding their own platforms. These potential competitors would not
only have to consider how to manage the new costs of achieving scale in a
marketplace where size is a key metric of success. They would also have to anticipate
the costs of other states’ introducing different bills. The result to the consumer will
be fewer platforms offering fewer services. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, The
Political Spectrum (2017) (explaining how previous media regulations such as the
FCC’s “Fairness Doctrine” have frequently operated to entrench dominant media
entities at the expense of smaller competition).
Diverse platform choice and competition is better for consumers and better
for groups who wish to reduce any individual platform’s influence. To the
consumer’s benefit, more platforms would allow users to express disapproval with
one platform’s editorial choice by spending time elsewhere. It would also strengthen
consumer feedback by forcing platforms to respond more rapidly or risk losing their
user base and their revenue. Groups who believe that platforms have too much power
benefit both by increasing the likelihood that they can find a platform that meets
their expectations and by witnessing a diaspora of similarly minded users from
disfavored platforms.

12
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Florida seeks to impose penalties of up to $250,000 per day for violations of
its social media regulations. It has also purported to create both a public and private
right of action for private accounts that have been “unfairly” or inconsistently
removed, under penalty of up to $100,000 for each successful claim. It’s hard to
imagine the next garage or dorm-room internet sensation emerging under such
conditions.
Further, consumers are best served by a competitive marketplace of both
moderated and unmoderated platforms with distinct, differentiable offerings.
Government-mandated “neutrality” requirements hamstring platforms’ ability to
respond to consumer preferences by removing a critical dimension by which
platforms can differentiate themselves: terms of service and community guidelines.
Content moderation at scale will always end up frustrating large segments of the
population, but a platform’s editorial discretion to moderate allows online platforms
to create communities dedicated to certain subject matters or viewpoints and to
remove hateful or harassing speech that may hinder the ability of users to engage
with the platform.
If states like Florida truly want to encourage a robust online speech
marketplace, their goal should not be to bind platforms to a given political actor’s
conception of neutrality. Instead, they should promote competition and reduce
regulatory compliance costs to ensure that citizens remain free to choose alternatives

13
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that might emerge from the same conditions of growth that current social media
success stories have benefitted from themselves.
CONCLUSION
The rights to free speech and press are fundamental and arguably our most
cherished civil liberties. They have been essential components of our republic’s
centuries-long successes. Whatever issues we may have with dominant social media
platforms today, robust application of the First Amendment’s protections for speech
and editorial control is not the problem.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED: November 15, 2021.

/s/ Ilya Shapiro
Ilya Shapiro
Counsel of Record
Thomas A. Berry
CATO INSTITUTE
1000 Mass. Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 842-0200
ishapiro@cato.org
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